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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
360-IRVINE, LLC, 360-IRVINE ) 
MEMBER, LLC, 360 RESIDENTIAL LLC, ) 
JEFF D. W ARSA W, CLARK BUTLER, ) 
JOHN WILLIAMS, PREFERRED ) 
APARTMENT COMMUNITIES, INC., ) 
IRVINE MEZZANINE LENDING, LLC, ) 
) 
) 
) 
TIN STAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, and 
TIN STAR-IRVINE MEMBERLLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
CAFN: 2015CV260541 
v. 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTIONS FOR MORE 
DEFINITE STATEMENT 
Before this Court is (1) Defendants John Williams, Preferred Apartment Communities, 
Inc., and Irvine Mezzanine Lending, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended 
Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement and (2) Motion and Brief 
to Dismiss Counts One, Two, Three, Five, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the First 
Amended Complaint by Defendants 360-Irvine, LLC, 360-Irvine Member, LLC, 360 
Residential, LLC, JeffD. Warshaw, and Clark Butler. Having considered the briefing, the 
responses, and the oral arguments, the COUli finds as follows: 
Taking the allegations in the First Amended Complaint as true, Plaintiff Tin Star 
Development, LLC ("Tin Star") was interested in purchasing a property in Irvine, California 
(the "Property") for development of an apartment complex. Tin Star sought a partner to provide 
funding. Defendants Preferred Apartment Communities, Inc. ("PAC") and John Williams, 
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PAC's Chairman, expressed an interest in providing funding. Tin Star alleges that over the 
course of various meetings, Williams and PAC represented to it that 360 Residential, LLC ("360 
Residential") was an in-house development affiliate of PAC. Defendants Clark Butler and Jeff 
Warshaw were represented to be liaisons of 360 Residential and also claimed to be affiliated 
with and backed by PAC. Butler and Warshaw claimed they needed Williams's approval for all 
of their actions. 
Tin Star and 360 Residential signed a Confidentiality, Non-Intervention, and Non- 
Circumvention Agreement (the "Confidentiality Agreement") on January 16,2013. Under the 
Confidentiality Agreement, Tin Star would share Property information and development plans. 
360 Residential agreed not to hinder or prevent Tin Star from pursuing its interest in or benefit 
from the Property and would only work with and through Tin Star to develop the Property for a 
period of three years after execution of the Confidentiality Agreement. TIlls Agreement was 
executed by Clark Butler as Member of 360 Residential and Larry White as Manager of Tin Star. 
On February 14,2013, two affiliates of Tin Star and 360 Residential, Plaintiff Tin Star- 
Irvine Member, LLC ("Tin Star Member") and Defendant 360-Irvine Member, LLC ("360 
Member") formed a new company, 360-Irvine, LLC (the "Company") to be governed under 
Delaware law. The Company's purpose was to carry out the purchase and development plan for 
the Property. Tin Star Member and 360 Member signed a Limited Liability Company 
Agreement (the "Company Agreement")' that included a long-term business plan (the "Business 
Plan"). Warshaw and Butler signed the Company Agreement in their capacity as members of 
360 Residential, who in turn is the member of 360 Member. 
The Company Agreement appoints Tin Star Member as Administrator and 360 Member 
as Manager. Tin Star Member was responsible for the Company's day-to-day business and 
I The Company Agreement was attached as Exhibit B to the Verified Complaint filed May 6, 2015. 
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implementing any Major Actions elected by the Manager in accordance with the Business Plan. 
360 Member, as the Manager, has the "full right, power, authority, and discretion to conduct the 
business and affairs of the Company, and to do all things necessary to carryon the business of 
the Company ... acting alone and without the consent of any other Member." Section 4.2( e) of 
the Company Agreement expressly states that the Manager "shall not have any fiduciary duties 
to any member or other Person bound by this Agreement; provided, however, the foregoing shall 
not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing" Section 4.2(e) also 
states: "To the fullest extent permitted by law, including Section 18-1101(e) of the [Delaware] 
LLC Act, the Manager shall not be liable to the Company, any Member or any other Person 
bound by this Agreement for breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) unless the Manager 
acted in bad faith or engaged in willful misconduct." 
Under the Company Agreement, 360 Member must use "commercially reasonable efforts 
to fund or arrange the funding necessary" for the development of the Property, including 
approximately $17 million to cover the Property purchase price and requisite building permits. 
Ultimately, Defendant Irvine Mezzanine Lending, LLC ("Irvine Mezzanine"), an affiliate of 
PAC, provided funding to the Company to purchase and develop the Property. The Company 
Agreement also provides for certain distributions to be made to the Members. 
Tin Star alleges that the relationship ultimately soured and Defendants began pressuring 
Tin Star to accept a reduced percentage of interest in the Property, a deal Tin Star rejected. Tin 
Star claims that Defendants subsequently failed to meet their obligations under the Company 
Agreement by failing to provide capital contributions, by failing to open a Company bank 
account, by failing to secure transferrable development rights ("TDRs"), and by interfering with 
Tin Star Member's day-to-day management of operations and Tin Star's contracts with certain 
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professionals. Tin Star Member was eventually removed as Administrator and no longer 
receives monthly distributions. The Company and 360 Member have refused to provide Tin Star 
Member with statements of distributions made or access to company records. 
Ultimately, Tin Star discovered that 360 Member and 360 Residential were not affiliated 
with PAC or Williams despite prior representations to the contrary, and had no source of funding 
independent of PAC and its affiliate, Irvine Mezzanine. Without independent funding, 360 
Member and the Company could stop making payments on its debt to Irvine Mezzanine, and 
Irvine Mezzanine could foreclose on the Property and wipe out Tin Star's interest in the Property 
altogether. Further, Tin Star alleges that Butler and Warshaw used Company assets to fund other 
unrelated projects and received kick-backs from commissions the Company paid to certain real 
estate brokers. 
Motion to Dismiss Standard 
It is well established that: 
[ a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the 
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.... In deciding a 
motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party 
who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the 
filing party's favor. 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73, 656 S.E.2d 820, 821 (2008) (quoting 
Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2),480 S.E.2d 10 (1997»; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
12(b)(6). "[A] trial court may properly consider exhibits attached to and incorporated in the 
pleadings in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief." Hendon 
Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275 Ga. App. 434,435 (2005). 
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Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint 
The Company, 360 Member, 360 Residential, Warshaw, and Butler (collectively, the 
"360 Defendants") seek dismissal of Counts 1,2,3,5, 7,8,9,10, & 11 brought against them. 
360 Defendants seek a more definite statement for Count 4. In a separate Motion, Defendants 
Williams, PAC, and Irvine Mezzanine (collectively, the "PAC Defendants") seek dismissal of 
the various tort claims brought against them. Since several of the torts are brought against both 
PAC Defendants and 360 Defendants, these motions will be addressed together. 
I. Express and Implied Contractual Claims against 360 Defendants only 
Count 1 alleges breach of the express terms of the Company Agreement, Count 2 alleges 
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, Count 7 alleges breach of fiduciary 
duty, and Count 10 requests an accounting. These are contract claims, subject to the choice of 
law provision in the Company Agreement selecting Delaware law as controlling. 
Count 1: Breach of Contract - Company Agreement (Tin Star Member 
against 360 Member and Company) 
The First Amended Complaint alleges that 360 Member and the Company breached the 
Company Agreement both through failure to act-failing to set up a Company bank account, to 
secure TDRs, and to provide capital contributions-and through certain other actions such as 
micro-managing Tin Star Member, interfering with Tin Star Member's contracts with various 
professionals, and removing it as Administrator after Tin Star Member refused to accept a lower 
ownership percentage. 
As an initial matter, though the Motion purports to seek dismissal of all claims, the 
Company does not provide any argument that Count 1 should be dismissed against it. Instead, 
360 Member argues that if Tin Star Member is owed a contractual duty, it must look to the 
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Company, not the Manager. Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 1 as to the 
Company is DENIED. 
360 Member seeks dismissal of COWlt 1 because its liability as Manager is limited by 
Section 4.2(e) of the Company Agreement. However, this exculpatory clause does not foreclose 
Tin Star Member from bringing a claim for breach of a contractual duty against 360 Member if it 
acted in bad faith or engaged in willful misconduct. Here, Tin Star Member alleges that 360 
Member breached its contractual duties only after Tin Star refused to take a reduced percentage 
in the Property and that as a result, these contractual breaches were willful and in bad faith. The 
Court finds that facts supporting the allegations as pled could show the exculpatory clause does 
not foreclose Tin Star Member's breach of contract claim as a matter of law. 
360 Member next argues that there could be no breach of contract in bad faith or 
otherwise because all the actions it took were authorized actions in its discretion as Manager 
under the Company Agreement. The Company Agreement gives 360 Member broad authority 
and discretion to carryon the Company's business, acting alone and without the consent of any 
other Member. For example, Tin Star Member complains it was removed as Administrator, but 
360 Member had the right under the Company Agreement to do so in its sole discretion. 
However, broad discretion generally in its performance of its duties cannot eliminate 360 
Member's express contractual duties to act in accordance with the express terms in the Company 
Agreement. For instance, Tin Star Member alleges that 360 Member breached its contractual 
duties to open the Company bank account, secure TDRs, and provide capital contributions and 
did so because Tin Star Member refused to accept a lower ownership percentage. 360 Member 
has failed to show that Tin Star Member cannot succeed on its breach of contract claim under 
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any set of facts. Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 1 as to 360 Member is 
DENIED. 
Count 2: Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Tin Star Member 
Against 360 Residential, 360 Member, Warshaw, and Butler)) 
Tin Star Member alleges that 360 Residential, 360 Member, Warshaw, and Butler all 
owed. duties of good faith and fair dealing to it but engaged in self-dealing. "[P]arties are liable 
for breaching the covenant when their conduct frustrates the' overarching purpose' of the 
contract by taking advantage of their position to control implementation of the agreement's 
terms." See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005). "The 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves a 'cautious enterprise,' inferring 
contractual terms to handle developments or contractual gaps that the asserting party pleads 
neither party anticipated." Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Del. 2010) (quoting 
Dunlap, infra) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss on breach of good faith and fair dealing 
claim and noting the implied covenant is "a limited and extraordinary legal remedy"). This 
implied covenant requires that the parties to a contract "refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable 
conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the 
fruits of the bargain." Id. "[T]o state a claim for breach of the implied covenant, [the plaintiff] 
'must allege a specific implied contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation by the 
defendant, and resulting damage to the plaintiff.'" Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC, 971 A.2d 
872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009). The Court should not apply the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in a manner that contradicts express terms of the agreement between the parties 
addressing the exact issue or that gives plaintiffs contractual protections that they failed to secure 
during contract negotiations. See Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC v. Northpointe 
Holdings, LLC, 112 A.3d 878,896-97 (2015). 
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As an initial matter, 360 Residential, Warshaw, and Butler are not parties to the Company 
Agreement-the only two parties are Tin Star Member and 360 Member. 360 Residential, 
Warshaw, and Butler signed the Company Agreement in their representative capacities only. 
Plaintiffs suggest in their briefing that discovery may uncover facts that would support piercing 
the corporate veils separating the entities and individuals, but this assertion is nowhere in the 
Complaint. Any claim that these three Defendants participated in conduct that frustrated the 
overarching purpose of the Company Agreement would be duplicative of Plaintiffs' claim for 
tortious interference as raised in Counts 3 and 8, discussed below. As such, 360 Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Count 2 as to 360 Residential, Warshaw, and Butler is GRANTED. 
As to 360 Member, Tin Star alleges that it used its position as majority owner to interfere 
with the overarching purpose of the contract after Tin Star refused to accept a reduced ownership 
interest. Specifically, Tin Star alleges that its removal as Administrator, 360 Member's refusal 
to pay expense reimbursements or share company books and records, and 360 Members' 
structuring of deals with PAC and Irvine Mezzanine frustrated the purpose of the Company 
Agreement and amounted to self-dealing. The Court agrees with 360 Member that it would be 
improper to imply a covenant that required a good faith basis for Tin Star's removal as 
Administrator in the face of a clear provision allowing 360 Member to do so with or without 
cause. Likewise, the Company Agreement expressly details the parties' rights as to expense 
reimbursements and access to books and records. And finally, the Company Agreement 
provides that 360 Member as Manager shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain 
funding to develop the Property on terms and conditions determined by the Manager. In the face 
of express contractual terms addressing the alleged misconduct of 360 Member as Manager, the 
Court cannot imply terms that give Tin Star Member rights that it failed to secure at the 
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bargaining table. Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 2 as to 360 Member is 
GRANTED. 
Count 7: Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Tin Star Member against 360 Member) 
Tin Star Member alleges that 360 Member as Manager breached its fiduciary duty owed 
to it by engaging in bad faith conduct and willful misconduct. 360 Member responds that 
Section 4.2(e) of the Company Agreement expressly states that the Manager "shall not have any 
fiduciary duties to any member or other Person bound by this Agreement." To the extent that the 
Company Agreement and the Delaware LLC Act 18-110 1 (e) carve out an exception for acts or 
omissions that constitute a bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, that claim has been raised in Count 2. Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Count 7 as to 360 Member is GRANTED. 
Count 10: Request for Accounting (against 360 Member and Company) 
Tin Star and Tin Star Member argue they are entitled to an accounting and access to 
corporate records under the Company Agreement. 360 Member and Company assert that any 
accounting claim lies solely against the Company by virtue of Section 4.2( e) of the Company 
Agreement, discussed above, which precludes actions against 360 Member, the Company's 
Manager. Tin Star argues that Section 4.2 does not apply as 360 Member has acted in bad faith 
when it breached the Company Agreement's provisions allowing Tin Star access to books and 
records. The Complaint alleges that 360 Member and the Company denied Tin Star denied 
access in breach of the Company Agreement because Tin Star refused to accept a smaller 
percentage ownership interest in the Property. Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Count 10 as to 360 Member and Company is DENIED. 
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II. Tort Claims 
The parties dispute what states' laws apply to the tort claims. Defendants assert that the 
Court should presume Georgia law applies since no other states' laws were pled in the 
Complaint. "A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of another state or of a 
foreign country shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice." O.C.G.A. § 
9-11-43(c). Plaintiffs counter that they have complied with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-43 by timely 
raising the likelihood that other states' laws may apply in their briefing opposing the Motions to 
Dismiss. They argue that discovery is needed to determine which states' laws are controlling 
under Georgia's rule of lex loci delicti, which requires the Court to apply "substantive law of the 
state where the tort was conunitted." Dowis v. Mud Slingers, lnc., 279 Ga. 808, 809 (2005). 
Without discovery, Plaintiffs cannot determine whether the tort occurred in California where the 
Property for development was located, or in Texas where the Plaintiffs are located, or 
somewhere else. Georgia law allows the Court to consider any relevant materials, whether or not 
admissible under the rules of evidence, to determine which states' laws apply. See O.C.G.A. § 
9-11-43(c). As such, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to seek discovery as to which states' laws 
apply to their tmi claims that survive this Motion. 
Count 3: Aiding and Abetting Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing (Tin Star Member against 360 Residential, Warshaw, Butler, PAC, 
and Williams) 
In Count 3, Tin Star Member alleges that 360 Residential, Warshaw, and Butler, along 
with PAC and Williams, all abetted and encouraged 360 Member's self-dealing to the detriment 
of its partner, Tin Star Member. To the extent that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is an 
implied contractual term, this claim is basically asserting that these Defendants interfered with 
360 Member's perfonnance of its implied contractual duties to Tin Star Member. As discussed 
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above, Tin Star Member failed to show that 360 Member breached an implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. Thus, Tin Star Member's claim of aiding and abetting this breach also fails. 
As such, the 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as to 360 Residential, 
Warshaw, and Butler is GRANTED. 
This count fails for the same reason against PAC and Williams. As such, the PAC 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as to PAC and Williams is GRANTED. 
Count 6: Tortious Interference with Contract (Tin Star Member against all 
PAC Defendants) 
In Count 6, Plainiffs allege that PAC Defendants acted intentionally to induce 360 
Member to breach the Company Agreement. PAC Defendants argue that the stranger doctrine in 
Georgia and Delaware would prohibit this claim. Plaintiffs contend that it is too soon to know 
what states' laws apply, and note that other states do not require that a party be a stranger to a 
contract to tortuously interfere with it. Therefore, PAC Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 6 
as to all PAC Defendants is DENIED. 
Count 8: Tortious Interference with a Fiduciary Relationship (Tin Star 
Member against Warshaw, Butler, Irvine Mezzanine, PAC, and Williams) 
Tin Star Member alleges that Warshaw, Butler, Williams, Irvine Mezzanine, and PAC 
"acted to procure 360 Member's breach of its fiduciary duty to Tin Star Member." A plaintiff 
must prove the following elements to succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a 
fiduciary relationship: 
(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the defendant 
acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer'S fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2) 
with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the 
defendant acted purposely and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's 
wrongful conduct procured a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty; and (4) 
the defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. 
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Insight Tech., Inc. v. FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19, 25-26 (2006). As discussed above, 
the Company Agreement expressly eliminated all fiduciary duties between members. In the 
absence of a breach of fiduciary duty by 360 Member, the alleged primary wrongdoer, there can 
be no claim tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship. Therefore, 360 Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Count 8 as to Warshaw and Butler is GRANTED. 
Likewise, Count 8 also fails against Irvine Mezzanine, PAC, and Williams in the absence 
of an underlying fiduciary duty. As such, PAC Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 8 as to 
Irvine Mezzanine, PAC, and Williams is GRANTED. 
Count 4: Fraud (Tin Star and Tin Star Member against Williams and PAC) 
PAC and Williams move for dismissal of Count 4 for fraud? They conclude in their 
briefing the "basic facts alleged by the Plaintiffs disprove and rebut any fraud by the PAC 
Defendants" without further elaboration. However, Plaintiffs have alleged the PAC Defendants 
made knowingly false statements to Plaintiffs about their relationship with 360 Residential. 
Plaintiffs argue they relied on these misrepresentations when they agreed to partner with 360 
Residential to develop the Property, and they have been damaged as a result. In Georgia, the 
proper remedy for a party seeking more particularity regarding a claim for fraud is a motion for a 
more definite statement. See TechBios, Inc. v. Champagne, 301 Ga. App. 592,594 (2009). 
Therefore, the PAC Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 4 as to PAC and Williams is 
DENIED. 
Count 5: Fraudulent Inducement (Tin Star and Tin Star Member against all 
Defendants except Irvine Mezzanine) 
Tin Star and Tin Star Member allege that it was fraudulently induced into entering into 
the Company Agreement with 360 Member to form Company by misrepresentations and false 
2 The 360 Defendants do not move to dismiss this count, but seek a more definite statement as to this claim, which is 
discussed below. 
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promises made by the 360 Defendants and the PAC Defendants. The First Amended Complaint 
alleges that Warshaw, Butler, and 360 Residential all claimed to be affiliated with PAC, and 
claimed that financing for the purchase and the development of the Property was backed by 
PAC. Williams told Tin Star representatives on a trip to California in January of2013 that PAC 
was going to do the deal and Tin Star would work with PAC's in-house affiliate and its liaisons, 
Warshaw and Butler. Warshaw and Butler represented to Tin Star that Williams's approval was 
needed for all of their actions. 
After Tin Star entered into the Company Agreement, however, it discovered that PAC 
and Williams had no obligation to provide funding to 360 Member or the Company and that 360 
Member had no independent ability to provide funding. Tin Star claims that it formed Tin Star 
Member and that Tin Star Member entered into the Company Agreement in reliance on these 
representations that PAC was affiliated with and backing the project. 
In response, Defendants assert that the fraudulent inducement claim against 360 Member 
is barred by a merger clause in the Company Agreement which states that the Agreement 
embodies the entire agreement and understanding between the parties and that there are no 
promises or representations other than those set forth in the Company Agreement. While 
Plaintiffs argue that it is too early to tell which states' laws apply to torts, the law of Delaware 
should apply when analyzing the effect of the Company Agreement's merger clause because the 
contract expressly chooses Delaware law. Under Delaware law, "a party cannot promise, in a 
clear integration clause of a negotiated agreement, that it will not rely on promises and 
representations outside of the agreement and then shirk its own bargain in favor of a 'but we did 
rely on those other representations' fraudulent inducement claim." Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & 
W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1057 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also H-M Wexford LLC v. 
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Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 143 (Del. Ch. 2003) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss the 
misrepresentation claims with respect to the information contained in a private placement 
memorandum that was not integrated into the final purchase agreement because purchase 
agreement had integration clause eliminating any prior representations). However, "murky 
integration clauses, or standard integration clauses without explicit anti-reliance representations, 
will not relieve a party of its oral and extra-contractual fraudulent representations." Abry 
Partners V, L.P. at 1059 (citing Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568,591 (Del. Ch. 2004)). In 
other words, the anti-reliance clause must clearly promise that the plaintiff "did not rely upon 
statements outside the contracts' four corners in deciding to sign the contract." Id. 
Here, the Merger Clause states: 
Section 11.9. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement 
and understanding of the parties hereto in respect of the subject matter contained 
herein. There are no restrictions, promises, representations, warranties, covenants, 
or undertakings, other than those expressly set forth or referred to herein. This 
Agreement supersedes all prior agreements and understandings between the 
parties with respect to such subject matter hereof. 
From a plain reading, the agreement eliminates any and all representations between the parties 
other than those found in the Company Agreement. The purported misrepresentations were not 
embodied as material terms to the Agreement, but are extra-contractual and thus barred under the 
express language of the Merger Clause. The language in this Merger Clause is nearly identical 
to the integration clause in the H-M Wexford LLC case cited above. Therefore, 360 Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Count 5 as to 360 Member is GRANTED. 
As previously noted, 360 Residential, Warshaw, and Butler are not parties to the 
Company Agreement and therefore are not bound by the merger clause contained therein. 
However, they argue that Count 5 for fraudulent inducement must be dismissed against them 
because Plaintiffs have not sought to rescind the Company Agreement, but rather have affirmed 
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the contract by raising their breach of contract and accounting claims arising under the Company 
Agreement. "In general, a party alleging fraudulent inducement to enter a contract has two 
options: (1) affirm the contract and sue for damages from the fraud or breach, or (2) promptly 
rescind the contract and sue in tort for fraud." Novare Group, Inc. v. Sarif 290 Ga. 186, 188 
(2010). "Where a party elects to rescind the contract, he must do so prior to filing the lawsuit." 
Id. However, Count 5 was pled in the alternative, it is unclear whether Georgia law will apply 
to this claim, and it is unknown at this time if the applicable states' laws will require an election 
of rescission. Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 5 as to Defendants 360 
Residential, Warshaw, and Butler is DENIED. 
Likewise, the PAC Defendants are not parties to the Company Agreement and are not 
bound by the Company Agreement or the merger clause. PAC Defendants have failed to 
demonstrate they could not succeed on this claim under any set of facts. Therefore, PAC 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 5 as to Defendants PAC and Williams is DENIED. 
Count 9: Joint Enterprise (against all Defendants) 
Tin Star and Tin Star Member allege that the 360 Defendants in conjunction with all the 
PAC Defendants acted as a joint enterprise. They allege that all Defendants "had an agreement, 
express or implied, a common purpose to be carried out, a community of pecuniary interest in 
that common purpose, and an equal right to control or direct the enterprise." Plaintiffs claim as a 
result of this joint enterprise, all Defendants are liable for the torts committed by Defendants 360 
Member, Warshaw, and Butler. Defendants argue neither Delaware nor Georgia law recognizes 
a claim for joint enterprise. However, as noted above, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to seek 
discovery as to which states' laws apply to this claim Therefore, 360 Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Count 9 as to all 360 Defendants is DENIED. 
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Likewise, the 360 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 9 as to all PAC Defendants is 
DENIED. 
Count 11: Expenses of Litigation (against all Defendants) 
Tin Star and Tin Star Member seek expenses of litigation. As certain claims survive this 
Motion, the Motions to Dismiss Count 11 as to all Defendants are DENIED. 
Motions for More Definite Statement 
The 360 Defendants assert that Count 4 for Fraud against all 360 Defendants should be 
pled with more specificity. They argue that the claim does not indicate the dates of the alleged 
fraud, who engaged in the fraud, or how Plaintiffs reasonably relied to their detriment. In 
Georgia, "no technical forms of pleading or motions are required." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(e)(I). 
However, "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstance constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9. "[A]llegations of fraud should 'At the 
very least ... designate the occasions on which affirmative misstatements were made and by 
whom and in what way they were acted upon.'" Hayes v. Hallmark Apartments, Inc., 232 Ga. 
307,309 (1974) (quoting Diversified Holding Corporation v. Clayton McLendon, Inc., 120 Ga. 
App. 455, 456 (1969)). Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their fraud claim to give 
Defendants notice of the circumstances forming the basis of the alleged fraud, thus fulfilling the 
ultimate goal of pleading with particularity-to allow a party to properly defend itself. As such, 
360 Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement is DENIED. 
Likewise, the PAC Defendants, in the alternative to a complete dismissal of all counts 
against them, seek a more definite statement. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have 
adequately pled their claims against the PAC Defendants. As such, PAC Defendants' Motion for 
a More Definite Statement is DENIED. 
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SO ORDERED THIS ~fMarCh' 2016. 
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